Uncertainty in Combat by Hughes, Wayne P. Jr.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Faculty and Researcher Publications Faculty and Researcher Publications
1994
Uncertainty in Combat
Hughes, Wayne P., Jr.
Military Operations Research
http://hdl.handle.net/10945/38441
F rom this uncertainty of all intelligence ic sonar would detect at a fixed, certain
and suppositions, this continual inter- range, a phenomenon called a "definite i Commentary
F position of chance, the actor in War range law." In the 1950s, a surface ship
constantly finds things different from his sonar detected at short ranges of about 1500
expectation: and this cannot fail to have an yards, so it was feasible to conduct a close-
influence on his plans, or at least on the ly controlled test. Destroyer sonars were Uncertainty
presumptions connected with these plans. run past a target submarine at known
If the influence is so great as to render the ranges. After isolating as many influences inC0 m ih
predetermined plan completely null, then, as possible, it was apparent that initial mnC  at
as a rule, a new one must be substituted in detection ranges were still variable, and
its place; but at the moment the necessary sonar detections on submarines remain so
data are often wanting for this, because in to this day. After the test Koopman con-
the course of action circumstances press for cluded that sonar detection ranges were Wayne P. Hughes, Jr.
immediate decision, and allow no time to more than likely deterministic, but there
look about for fresh data, often not enough were other important variables not S eno t er
for mature consideration, accounted for in the test. He went on to say Deari
that even if sonar detection range was Research
- K. von Clausewitz deterministic, in actual operations many of Naval Postgraduate School
On War the influences known to have major effects Monterey Califoria 93943
on detection range and fixed in the testChance favors the prepared mind, would be highly variable during screening
- Louis Pasteur operations, so that for all practical purpos-
es sonar detection range would have to be The following commentary is
treated as if it was a stochastic process. taken verbatim from a forth-
INTRODUCTION Now this must be added: very often the coming monograph entitled
stochastic representation of sonar detection Oga tuen e
Uncertainty in combat is a very big subject, performance (a "lateral range curve") can Organizing Study." The
pervading nearly every aspect of combat be set aside and without any loss of predic- elucidates a theory of combat
theory, including tive accuracy. A simple definite range law eloed a The Military
a the setting in which command decisions (a half "sweep width") can be substituted Conflict Institute. TMCIs
are made for computational purposes. In many cir- oflicnstute uMon
* the effectiveness of decision implementa- cumstances, a stark, determin-istic sweep theory is constructed upon
tion width will yield predictions that are pre- core definitions and six
* the dependability of plans and expecta- cisely as accurate as if the complex lateral "Uncertainty is inherent in
tions range curve had been used. combat."
* the purpose and value of combat analysis It is small wonder that discussions of omt
uncertainty and chance become muddled. Soe bmortan esth
We will examine the relationships For one isolated hardware component of awear below are defined else-
between chance, probability, risk, surprise, naval combat effectiveness, a QHB sonar where in the monograph,
and security as factors in combat. The (later improved and redesignated the among them, combat poten-
axiomatic umbrella term is uncertainty. AN/SQR-4 and AN/SQS-4), we have seen tial, combat power, and the
Uncertainty is a subject that pervades the that (1) it is possible to believe determinism attributes and states of ele-
science, art, and poetry I1] of combat in in principle, (2) determinism must be reject- ments. Their meaning will be
equal measure, and plagues the discussions ed in operational practice, but (3) deterrnin- clear enough, I believe. Terms
of scientists, military leaders, and philoso- ism as a model of a probabilistic phenom- related to uncertainty will be
phers. I wish to emphasize that it is partly a enon can be assumed in many circum- defined herein.
matter of perspective whether one views stances and used without any loss of pre-
combat as highly random and stochastic or dictive power whatsoever. Perspective or
highly determined by participants' choices, context is often the key to understanding-
both deliberate and inadvertent. To show or misunderstanding. When people dis-
this I introduce some insight, taken from agree, it is about the extent and pertinence
OEG Report 69 by B. 0. Koopman [1953]. of uncertainty and determinism in combat.
Koopman dealt with the operational value Perspective is the nub of the issue.
of a physical phenomenon: sonar detection. Command is interested in victory, that is,
He wished to know whether when all the mission success with acceptable loss of
variables were taken into account, a specif- combat potential relative to the enemy's
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loss. Command accepts that it will not know Before proceeding, the reader is encouraged to
before, during, or even after a battle all the sto- read the discussion Determinism in Combat in the
chastics of it. Given an advantage in combat Addendum, written by Paul Moose of the Naval
power that is large enough, command can pre- Postgraduate School. This will clarify what is
dict one outcome, a victory, "for all practical pur- meant by random (stochastic), deterministic,
poses". Much of combat analysis is concerned risk, chance and probability.
with achieving an advantage that will be deter-
minative. Nevertheless, from the perspective of a
man in a tank in the first wave of an over- DISCUSSION OF COMPONENTS
whelming armored force, many personal out-
comes are possible, and his part of the battle is Figure 6-1 shows the major components of
full of uncertainty and risk. uncertainty. Postulate for the moment that per-
Determinism is not synonymous with com- fect information is at hand regarding the attrib-
plete knowledge or absolute truth. "Deter- utes, location and motion (the state) of all
mined" expresses the condition in which the physical elements, and further that all these
record of past events or a prediction of future objects' behaviors are entirely deterministic.
events is so accurate that any deviation from This knowledge would be gained from (1) per-
absolute truth-the actual states of elements- is fect data of the weapons, modes of movement,
inconsequential relative to the practical applica- existing terrain and weather, and by perfect dis-
tion of the knowledge. cipline among troops; and (2) perfect and instan-
taneous knowledge of all positions and
movements at the time of observation, so that we
DEFINITIONS AND RELATED have a complete picture of the present. This is
ISSUES depicted as Situation 1 in Figure 6-1.Even in a deterministic environment there
Uncertainty is a state of doubt about the past, remain uncertainties about the future. We do
present or future combat situation, including the not know what the enemy will do. Chess illus-
outcome. trates a contest with complete knowledge of pre-
sent (and past) conditions in which the outcome
Chance is an unexpected and unexplained cause is nevertheless uncertain. Nor can we foresee
of an event that happens without discernible future events in nature: chaos theory is the study
human intention or observable cause. Accident of the limits of prediction about processes that
is a synonym [2J. are deterministically described, operating on
objects whose initial states are fastidiously spec-
Risk is the possibility of loss or harm. In combat ified! Nor can we be sure that orders will be
it is some compound of the natural odds (proba- acted on as intended even when troops execute
bilities), the degree of uncertainty (incomplete with the best of motives what they believe are
knowledge resulting in doubt), and the adverse their orders.
consequences of an unfavorable outcome (the Consequently a combat outcome on a deter-
cost of error). Hazard is similar but not a syn1- ministic battlefield would still be uncertain, its
onym. future course would appropriately be described
stochastically, and it would be seen by the com-
Deterministic means that a predicted or mander to involve risk, sometimes even chance.
observed result is so accurate that any deviation When we relax the artificial postulation that
from prediction or observation is inconsequen- physical objects behave deterministically
tial relative to practical application. Deter- (Situation 2 in Figure 6-1) we have at best a prob-
ministic is not synonymous with "completely ability distribution on their performance, and in
known." addition, will have to contend with events
whose pattern we do not know: "accidents"
governed, we would have to say, by chance.
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Acuarea One technicality must be dealt with.
fnatiaor=nd Uncertainty is defined as a state of doubt about
the combat situation. Occasionally a combatant
will have no doubt but will nevertheless not
mFully know the situation. Simple ignorance arises
Uncrtaintie when he does not know what he does not know.
1. E coi More complex ignorance arises when he isr Metnisd 2. Futureevets
actions 3. Extent towhic aion deceived: perfect deception would be the result
beexeas when the enemy misleads a combatant to beintndd absolutely certain but totally wrong about the
(contains Rk is present combat situation. The possibility of negative
anw information is a plague on any mathematical
Situation 1: Deterministic Behavior construct describing a state of knowledge. It
would be convenient if the state of knowledge
neasuremnt and could be bounded by, say, zero representing no
t knowledge and one representing complete
Lk or Knowledge knowledge of locations and movements. But if
infonion] one admits either disinformation, and in all con-
ftbabi lay 2 Eyydis o n flict one must, or predisposition, and in all
Sadte human endeavor one must, then the range of
IUncertainty knowledge states must take negative values, in
Stocastic (as in Situation 1) which the combatant is better off knowing noth-
aiy 
-ing than being deceived by the enemy or by his
own prejudice. We finesse this problem and
subscribe to the usual definition of uncertainty
(now affected by Result is greater risk, as a cognitive state of a combatant in which
chance unknowrns, 1 and greater when knowledge is received uncertainty dimin-and stochasti opportunities
processes) ishes. Misapprehension about the situation, that
Situation Z: Stochastic Behavior and Chance is, certainty that is unjustified, is a special cir-
iuron 6: S tohsti ehaiof U n ancet cumstance which represents a cognitive state
Figure 6-1: Elements of Uncertainty worthy of special, advanced study.
Another source of legitimate confusion about
uncertainty is simply how one goes about decid-
ing cause and effect. It has been called the "tele-
When we relax the additional postulation that ological problem" [Thomas, 1989, pp. 263-265].
the state of all objects is known we introduce In the Introduction to the complete monograph
uncertainty that comes from lack of knowledge, it was observed that to verify the predictions of
including inadequate intelligence about the their mathematical models physicists have to
enemy, data about own forces, disinformation specify initial conditions and measure the results
from the enemy, and disinformation (usually with great care. The whole of predictive science
inadvertent) about own forces. As we have said, is centered on this capability. With either combat
even if all information could be had after enough or combat models boundary conditions are a
time, timeliness of decision is a taskmaster that perplexing challenge. We face the question of
will always proscribe a complete picture. The where to cut off accounting for the causes of
lack of knowledge regards present states. The results, and on the outcome side, where to stop
same severe shortage of information compounds counting the downstream effects of a battle. In
regarding future activities, social science, understanding is clouded and
The consequence is not only a priori uncer- uncertainty grows to the extent that one insists
tainty, but certainty that chance will enter into on admitting remote causes of the course of a
the outcome. Naturally the effect is greater risk. battle. Here is Thomas quoting me:
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Teleology is the study of final causes. A simulation or the historian's description, it
model always asserts a certain cause and circumscribes the event with some set of
effect, even when it has sophisticated feed- cause and effect relationships. Any model,
back loops ... We assume a cause when even the most ambitious, is vulnerable on
we write inputs ... The model not merely ground of sufficiency-its omission of the
asserts presumed first cause, but circum- n-th order "cause-of-a-cause-of-a-cause..
scribes for its user the world of admissible
cause. Thomas is as incisive as can be on this subject.
Here he is referring specifically to model valida-
Consider a warfare example: Why did Lee tion, but what he has to say is equally apt for his-
lose at Gettysburg? Historians may take as toriography, operational planning or strategic
the proximate cause the ill-considered interpretation of battles.
charge of Pickett on the third day. Or pos-
sibly Meade's artillery, massed in the cen-
ter. UNCERTAINTY IN THE
As causes "once removed," there was CONTEXT OF THE THEORY
Meade's astute tactical leadership and During a campaign (or in peacetime) a comman-
Lee's uncharacteristic error. But few histo- der must compare strengths and make forecasts
rians stop there. The cause was "really" Jeb using combat potential and a vision of how
Stuart's absence, so that Lee fought blind, forces will be employed. His aim is favorable
Or the earlier death of his stalwart results when battles ensue. A higher commander
Stonewall Jackson. assigns forces to the battle commander based on
relative combat potential and other factors, but
Deeper still, it was simply the inevitability the generation of combat power is not within his
that sooner or later the odds would catch control. The battle commander activates poten-
up with Lee, and his daring battlefield tac- tial to create combat power. He controls the
tics would overextend him. The funda- modes of his forces, but he is limited by their
mental cause, therefore, was the Union's designed attributes. An AEGIS naval cruiser is
greater mobilization base. Lee was formidable against air-to-surface missiles, but
impelled by a sense of urgency, knowing has nothing special to offer against submarines.
that time was against him. Thus, what his- An armored battalion is superior to light
torians may call a tactical blunder was infantry on its own turf but will be victimized in
Lee's last-gasp gamble, a gamble made mountainous terrain.
with a thoroughgoing appreciation of the While a commander makes his deployments
true odds against breaking through the so does the enemy. Combat effectiveness, or
center. force, is determined by decisions on both sides
and the resulting interactions. It is the collision
None of the "causes" above is unimpor- of two forces that determines the outcome of a
tant, and the list is by no means exhaustive, battle. Only the results are observable. Any
One could add the Union quartermasters' attempt to trace the effect of new and better com-
efficiency ("logistics dominate war"), the bat potential, as represented by a new sensor,
motivating reasons why the soldiers weapon, commander, fighting doctrine or force
fought tenaciously, etc., etc. mix, from cause (combat potential) through
combat power, two sided combat effectiveness,
All the causes contributed to the effect: the and a two-sided outcome leaves a wide gulf of
Confederates lost the battle. Any model of uncertainty. It takes extraordinary insight or
it will emphasize some things and deem- unabashed hubris to draw conclusions without
phasize others, even to the point of exclu- examining the intervening gap between combat
sion. Whether the model is the analyst's potential and result, and in peacetime all such
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examinations are speculative, plans, formally and otherwise, which they
I once was charged with corroborating a expected to be bent and distorted by chance and
model and undertook the task by refighting the the actions of the enemy, but not broken.
Falklands War of 1982 on a computer, using the Analysts must be less sure, and lean more heav-
strategies and tactics of the Argentines and fly on the methods of probability theory. For one
British [Hughes; 1986]. The results did not com- thing, the problems analysts study are the ones
pare well because combat effectiveness in the without easy answers: what purpose is served
model was based on armored and mechanized to study the obvious? By contrast a combat leader
warfare in Europe and the war was fought by moves heaven and earth to fight only battles
infantry. When this obvious defect was with obvious, good outcomes. The rule of war is
repaired, there were still sometimes wide differ- never to pick on someone your own size. For
ences. The model said there would be serious another, the analyst (except when he is in close
casualties to the U. K. transports from air attacks proximity to the battle as in the air Battle of
on the day of the landing when there were in fact Britain) must handle too many variables. He is
none. When a model predicts reasonably and the man described above who must speculate
history is outlandish, one does not alter the (an appropriate word) about results when he has
model; one continues to expect troopship losses at best combat potential to work with, and even
when a landing is opposed by a massive air that may be potential that exists only on a draw-
attack. There is no gainsaying poor tactics, but ing board.
one does not often want a model that employs What we have said argues neither that chance
them. [3] dominates war, nor that uncertainty is unimpor-
It has been argued that uncertainty plays a tant. It argues neither that outcomes can never be
bigger part in single events because the central forecast, nor that good analysis always makes
tendency of large numbers cannot play its role. good forecasts. It would be a narrow interpreta-
This is disputable on theoretical grounds: only tion of Clausewitz indeed to conclude that he
the mean value is better determined or more pre- believed that war was governed by uncertainty,
dictable; the standard deviation of n different or that outcomes were a roll of the dice.
variables does increase as 'n. It is also dis-
putable by the evidence: top warriors achieve
remarkable strings of victories. Why this is so, INTERPRETATION
and why the best still may fall, are too large a
matter to take up, but it is better to study the The power of prediction depends, first, on what
determinable factors that build up the strings of is demanded of it. A win or lose outcome may be
victories than to play up the role of chance or essentially certain when the details are not. That
luck. Champions retain a sense of the whole con- "no plan survives contact with the enemy" is not
test. They lose some points but they win the the same as saying no plan is executed in its
tournament. important features. The author of the saying, the
elder von Moltke, was one of military history's
most successful evaders of any evil conse-
THE LIMITS OF UNCERTAINTY quences of uncertainty.
If an advantage in combat power (observe the
A remarkable property of military uncertainty is shift from potential to power) is sufficient and
that after it has been turned over in the hand sensibly employed, chance cannot alter the out-
until all facets are seen, a great deal of combat come in its significant aspects. If the advantage
remains deterministic against our standard of in raw power is great enough, brute strength
consequentiality. Great leaders themselves tend will even overcome both poor employment and
to discount uncertainty. Nelson's most famous a more skillful opponent.
fighting instructions said, "Something must be Amidst uncertainty, knowledge is still power.
left to chance," but the same instructions were The commander and forces with the most infor-
crafted to eliminate it. Such leaders had battle mation, both technical and operational, have a
Military Operations Research, Summer 1994 Page 49
COMMENTARY
great advantage. Experienced soldiers believe guns instead of numbers of ships [Hughes, 1984,
knowing what can be known overwhelms in its p. 43]. The British admiralty always tried to
importance what cannot, i.e., chance, insofar as match an equal number of units, counting a
aggregate results are concerned. If skill is regard- three-decker as two units, not one and one-half,
ed as a special form of knowledge, many will when distributing its combat potential against
insist that the advantage in both knowledge and the French (and sometimes the Dutch, Danish,
skill will determine outcomes in their major and Spanish). Equality was deemed sufficient
form. This includes skillful defeats, as with doubtless because the Royal Navy's superior
Robert E. Lee and Leonidas, as well as victories, seamanship was an unspoken tie-breaker in bat-
"What is called 'foreknowledge'" wrote Sun tle. But this method of counting was a CINC's
Tzu, "cannot be elicited from spirits, nor from device; it was left to the tactical commander to
gods, nor by analogy with past events, nor from transform his combat potential into combat
calculations. It must be obtained from men who power effectively.
know the enemy situation [1963; p. 145]." Let us inquire into the value of modeling
A major part of skill and expertise is recog- human performance. All analysis can ever do is
nizing and avoiding situations dominated by create IF-THEN statements. Every model-data
uncertainty or chance when superior, and creat- pair is an IF that produces a result which is a
ing opportunities for uncertainty for the enemy THEN. When the human factor is stripped out
when inferior, of analysis so that combat is done fearlessly and
The relative value of opposing forces can and efficiently, the uncertainty about the data and
should be estimated, as can comparisons model is less. Therefore the results appear to be
between different tactical employments in vari- less uncertain. We have artificially created a rel-
ous combinations. Except when chance inter- atively tight IF-THEN statement because we
venes inordinately (the crazy, absurd loss of the have entertained fewer variables. In many cases
nail in the shoe of the horse of the messenger car- a customer should prefer it that way: he will be
rying the vital order) the evaluations have pre- happy to have the additional clarity and preci-
dictive power far beyond simple win-lose sion and be content to use his own judgment
estimates. We are dealing with the distinction, regarding the effects of human factors. There are
which is always present, between the realistic other times when ducking the issue of human
"You may expect victory" and the Delphic "You performance is an evasion of responsibility.
shall have victory." Historians must not take Either way, when we add human elements on
unequivocal predictions by successful leaders the IF side we are going to increase, not decrease,
literally. These are part of the poetry of com- the spread of possible outcomes on the THEN
manders. side. By including uncertainty about the human
Once again, perspective is important. The element we hope to achieve the positive result of
allocation of combat potential by a CINC to his moving the center of gravity of results toward
subordinates amidst scarcity can never be "truth", but we cannot hope to improve the pre-
greater than approximately right, but it is suffi- dictive power of the analysis. At best we will
cient for his purpose if he does so with perspi- have a more accurate mean but a wider variance.
cacity. Corbett takes four pages in The Campaign Professional knowledge and discipline con-
of Trafalgar [1910, 43-46] to show that for plan- tribute in the direction of determinism. The
ning purposes the Admiralty counted a three- course of a battle was more predictable when
decker ship of the line as worth two two-deckers. Grant fought Lee than when the green Union
Mahan says "in current naval opinion one three- army met the newly formed Confederate army
decker was better than two seventy-fours [the at First Bull Run. A more subtle manifestation:
basic two-decker]" and C. S. Forester expresses "deterministic" conditions are often the insight
the same view. These attitudes (not the histori- of the informed mind that is able to recognize
ans' but the naval officers') were empirical. The patterns when the uninformed sees chaos. This
same result can be computed analytically by is, in classical terms, the coup d'oeil, and in mod-
applying the Lanchester square law to ships' em science, the hoped-for fruits of Chaos Theory
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itself: macro patterns seen amidst micro unpre- analysis should be, too. Also present is an under-
dictability. current of dissatisfaction with model results, and
The man who expects to fight without fear of so more detail is sponsored as the correction.
failure is in the wrong profession and should How to make a better model is much of the moti-
turn to civil engineering where he can apply his vation of this study, but in these discussions the
knowledge of statics, make his computations of point to be made is that more detail is not the
structural strength required, and then triple his answer, nor in most instances is more stochastic-
estimates to be safe. Still, the soldier makes his ity, that is, Monte Carlo simulation.
estimates, too, in order to to go with the odds. I do not believe one disregards uncertainty, I
As for predictive power, only a small fraction simply do not believe a representation of the true
of historical, sociological, or other study and uncertainty can even be approached, much less
analysis of warfare is for the purpose of predic- emulated, in a combat model. In the light of
tion. The greatest effort and the greatest value is what has gone before, perhaps one clean exam-
for description. When the description is rigorous ple will suffice. The Lanchester equations and
we gain understanding. When it is poetic we their many offspring- simple models of force
gain insight. Something similar can be said of against force- are all deterministic. It is argued
quantitative methods: they are used first to test that a stochastic version, which is now easily
what is thought to be true or good; then we accomplished with computers, is preferable on
apply them in the hope of learning what might grounds that combat is made up of stochastic
be better. Good description leads first to under- duels. Indeed, Ancker and Gafarian [1988] have
standing and insight, next to the power of better shown that the trajectory of the stochastic ver-
decision, and only after that to the desired end: sion leads to a different outcome in a duel to the
greater combat power on the battlefield. Thus, death, than the deterministic version. What they
to ask science how much uncertainty in a battle say is true but irrelevant. The stochastic version
will affect predictions about its outcome is to ask describes who kills whom and when, but noth-
the wrong question. The question science can ing more. If the stochastic version is more realis-
answer is how much do chance and uncertainty tic, it is infinitesimally so. One moves a great
affect our understanding of the combat phenom- distance toward understanding combat in its
enon? The answer is extensively; enough so as many modes by examining a variety of deter-
to make scientific study of the phenomenon a ministic force-on-force equations side-by-side
worthy endeavor, and enough to make it with examining battle data for similar situations.
axiomatic in a theory. He moves about one millimeter further in
understanding (or predicting) by tracing
through the probability distribution of the twoSTOCHASTIC MODELING sides' casualties. To believe the use of stochastic
Lanchester makes him much wiser, he must
Now I come to a personal interpretation with believe that only firepower determines results,
which some analysts, a minority I believe, and firing range and movement are inconsequential,
many military leaders, probably a majority, will mission is irrelevant, territory is immaterial, fire-
disagree. It is that the multifaceted nature of power effectiveness can be determined within a
uncertainty argues for model simplicity, not few percentage points, and on and on. In fact for
complexity. There is a longrunning attempt, the difference between deterministic results and
especially in the U. S. Army, to learn more and mean values of the stochastic results to show up,
better lessons by building more and more com- the battle must go on until most of one side are
plicated simulations. Elsewhere, including the casualties. Such battles are so rare as to be anom-
U. S. Navy and the Joint Staff in the Pentagon, a alies.
similar mindset has led to development of very How should one deal with uncertainty? The
complicated war gaming systems with much answer always depends upon the aim, but here
stochasticity built in. The argument is that are some old truths. One should never believe
because battles are complicated, the tools of he has eliminated uncertainty. He cannot. He
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should never believe he has represented it sto- latter measures will always be for understand-
chastically in more than one or two aspects. He ing, not for prediction.
cannot, so stochasticity should be incorporated When a debate occurs over the degree of
at particular times for special purposes. A model uncertainty, chance and risk, it is well to define
should only be as complicated as the considera- the context carefully. Context is the cause of
tions that go into the operational plan it sup- more dispute than real differences of opinion, at
ports, which means that it will look a couple of least among authorities.
echelons down, should look at as many varia-
tions as possible, and should allow for surprises.
This is a recipe for breadth, not depth, of analy- ENDNOTES
sis. The analysis that went into the design of the
Maginot Line was flawless: the line was never 1. The poetry of warfare is an essential concept of
breached. The analysis of the defense of France the monograph, "Combat Science." To be con-
failed because it wasn't expanded out of the con- cise, poetry is the stimulater of the emotions of
text of the Maginot Line. warriors. It manifests itself as morale,
willpower, staunchness, fighting spirit and
other human qualities that lead to acts of
CONCLUSION valor. [page 2]
The essential and axiomatic property of combat 2. In this study chance will not be used to mean
is not that it is stochastic but that it is suffused the likelihood or probability of an event occur-
with uncertainty. Following immediately is a ring. [page 3]
truism of the most fundamental significance:
combat involves risk of personal and institution- 3. I had occasion to talk to an Argentine aviator,
al harm. Commander A. D. Dabini, who flew scouting
Because combat comprises both random and missions with S-2Fs. He said, of course his side
deterministic phenomena, perspective deter- should have hit the troops ashore and afloat.
mines how much weight to place on each. For a For an intense, detailed and factual account
commander at any level, perspective is top see Woodward [1992; pp. 222-289]. Admiral
down: the grasp of all things in general and Woodward is quite blunt about the aviators'
some essential details in particular, toward mis- error and its costliness to the Argentine side.
sion accomplishment. For the analyst it is often [page 7]
bottom up: all influences are possible, so he must
choose among them to build up a picture of the
battle dynamic sufficient, but just sufficient, to REFERENCES
solve a problem.
A good description and understanding come Operations Evaluation Group, OEG Report 69,
before prediction. If predictive power is the aim, Characteristics of Sonar Performance as Indicated by
the reduction of risk is a reasonable goal, not the Analysis of 1951 OPDEVFOR Trial Data,
elimination of uncertainty. Neither tactician nor December 1953.
analyst should expect much detail from his pre-
diction a priori. Neither should expect much C. J. Ancker, Jr. and A. V. Gafarian, The Validity
accuracy regarding cause and effect even a poste- of Assumptions Underlying Current uses of
riori. When one visits the Delphic oracle to see Lanchester Attrition Rates, University of Southern
the future, he should ask modest questions. His California, and U. S. Army TRAC, White Sands
measure of effectiveness had better be coarse Missile Range, March 1988, pages 6-16.
grained, like mission accomplishment, not fine
tuned, like the movement of things during the J. S. Corbett, The Campaign of Trafalgar, London,
battle, the quality of each man's decision, and the Longman's, 2 vols., 1919
state of morale when the fighting is over. These
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W. P. Hughes, Jr. and J. A. Larson, The Falklands Japanese carriers were sunk at the Battle of
Wargame, CAA Study Report CAA-SR-86-21, Midway. The USSR had 20 million mortalities
September 1986. in World War II.
Even after the event, there is room for obser-
W. P. Hughes, Jr., Fleet Tactics: Theory and vational error, or incomplete information.
Practice, Annapolis, Md. Naval Institute Press, Physics' Uncertainty Principle tells us that com-
1986.
plete information about subatomic particles can-
C. J. Thomas, "Verification Revisited," in not be determined even from the most carefully
Military Modeling, 2nd Edition, Alexanrina, Va., done experiments. But for many practical pur-
MORS, 1989. poses the position/motion of the particle will bedetermined well enough to use.
Sun Tzu, The Art of War, London, Oxford Conclusion: Determinism is not synonymous
University Press, 1963. with complete knowledge and absolute truth.
E. Wigner, quoted in B. Gregory in Inventing "Determined" expresses the condition in which
RealityNer, qoe d the record of past events and prediction of future
events is so accurate ("full of truth") that any
deviation from the absolute truth is inconse-J. Woodward (with P. Robinson), One Hundred qeta eaiet h rcia plctoso
Days: The Memoirs of the Falklands Battle Group quential relative to the practical applications of
DomaydTher, M poiso te val sBatt e the knowledge [2]. Also note that absolute truth
Commander, Annapolis, Md. Naval Institute about known events is itself a construct, which
Press, 1992.
may not be observable, for example from uncer-
tainty principle arguments.
ADDENDUM: DETERMINISM IN Stochasticity is usually taken as synonymous
COMBAT [11 with "random," and we do so, too. The idea of
stochasticity is that we cannot predict a priori
Essential Concepts which of a set of possible events or sequence of
events will occur. However, the event or
A priori determinism is the ability to predict sequence in question becomes deterministic a
events (results or outcomes) in advance. posteriori, after it has occurred, and so it is no
Examples: long unknowable. If, a priori, several events or
sequences of events are possible, then we may
* Tidal motion. Chemical reactions. The return say we are "uncertain" about which of these will
of Halley's comet. Everyone will die. In a ten- occur; we may ask with what likelihood we
nis match, Martina Navratilova will defeat think a particular one will occur. Thus we see the
Paul Moose. An aircraft carrier will defeat a intellectual connection between stochasticity,
gunboat. uncertainty, and likelihood. We have established
clear distinctions for "uncertainty" and "pre-
Although the prediction may not be exact in dictability," but we did so in a way that does not
every detail and every situation, it is close violate usage or their traditional relationship
enough to truth to be considered an accurate with stochasticity.
prediction. Frequently the term chance is used synony-
mously with likelihood, e. g., "all sequences
A posteriori determinism is the accurate reporting have equal chance" to mean the same thing as
"after the fact" of an event or sequence of events. "all sequences are equally likely." We will not.
It is a statement of historical fact. Examples: We need to reserve a word for the unexplainable
occurrence, and we have chosen the word
• Gambling last night, I threw four "seven's" in "chance." Which sequence occurs is in our con-
a row. The Germans lost World War II. Four text governed by likelihood or probability.
Military Operations Research, Summer 1994 Page 53
COMMENTARY
Illustrations of Concepts C. Naval Battle Group Air Defense. This
combat situation is so intricate that it can only be
A. Rolling a "seven" four times in a row described as a coarse-grained series of events:
with dice. There are 16 possible sequences of
events in the course of rolling two dice 4 times. (1) Long Range Strike Aircraft (LRA) are sent to
[S = seven, A = anything else]: attack a Naval Battle Group (BG).(2) The BG has surveillance aircraft (SA) which
1) S S S S may or may not detect the incoming LRA.
2) S S S A (3) The BG also has fighter aircraft (FA) which
3) S S A S may or may not intercept the LRA, given an
... SA report of detection.
(4) If the fighters intercept, they may shoot
16) A A A A down from zero to all of the LRA.
(5) The surviving LRA (from zero to all) may or
A priori I am "uncertain" about which may not find and attack the BG and sink or
sequence you will roll, but I may compute the disable from zero to all of its ships.
probability, or likelihood, that you will roll (6) Surviving LRA rearm and reattack. The bat-
sequence #1). A posteriori, as reported in the tle ends when all LRA are shot down, or run
illustration above, I know, if you are truthful, out of missiles, or all ships are sunk or dis-
that you rolled sequence #1). There is no more abled, or the LRA commander stops attack-
uncertainty about what happened. ing.
B.'A tank battle. Red and Blue, each with
three tanks, fight until one side is reduced to one Though this is not a very complicated battle,
tank. The possible sequence of events (results) no one would claim that its progression above is
"lead to six outcomes: a priori determined." Much uncertainty, even
chance, are at work in the detail, for example
1) 3,3 2,3 1,3 exactly when and which SA detect which LRA,
S2) 3,3 2,3 2,2 1,2 which FA engages which LRA, how much dam-
3) 3,3 2,3 2,2 2,1 age a particular missile will do to a particular
4) 3,3 3,2 2,2 1,2 ship when it hits, and so forth. Even to enumer-
5) ate all the event sequences in this problem is6) 3,3 3,2 3,1 complicated: "SA #2 detects LRA #5 at 1506. It
vectors FA #6 at 1507. FA #6 fails to intercept at
Before the battle, the commanders are uncer- 1512. LRA #5 closes the BG and launches two
tain about which sequence will occur. They may ASM's at 1521. One missile misses; one hits and
be interested in their likelihood of "victory," severely damages an escort cruiser at 1525" and
defining a blue victory to be more blue than red so forth.
tanks left, and vice versa. A priori determinism This describes one portion of one event
would guarantee a particular sequence. From a sequence. There are a very large number of pos-
particular tank crew's perspective, determinism sible sequences of events. Which sequence will
would even require knowledge of whether their transpire is very uncertain. However, at some
tank would be a survivor, something that cannot overall level of battle outcome it is still possible
be deduced from the above sequence of events, to say that because of the numbers and attribut-
When the battle is over, the outcome is "deter- es of the aircraft, their sensors, their communica-
mined" a posteriori as 3,1; 2,1; 1,2; or 1;3, as well tions, and their weapons, the winner of this
as the sequence of events (path 1, 2,3,4,5, or 6), battle "for all practical purposes" is determined.
and even which tanks survive. But we may not Sometimes we may confidently make this pre-
know what has been determined, tank by tank, diction, even though the exact progression of
because we may not have all the data. events is undetermined a priori, and is unknow-
able in complete detail a posteriori.
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Conclusion. Even though all combat at a suffi- matical statement of how close the actual num-
ciently detailed level of description will be ber of occurrences will be to the expected num-
uncertain in evolution, some combat processes ber. As the number of times a controlled
and outcomes are deterministic a priori at a suffi- experiment (or identical battles!) is repeated
cient level of aggregation. Recall that determin- again and again, the ratio of the average value of
ism in scientific experiments means results that the results to the expected value tends toward
are predictable to a degree of accuracy such that one. The Law of Large Numbers quantifies, or
any deviation from actual outcome is inconse- measures, this central tendency. The traditional
quential. interpretation of probability as relative frequen-
cy in repeated trials, and the demands for many
trials imposed by the Law of Large Numbers,
Measuring Deterministic cause concern in the application to combat of
Phonomena probability theory, and its averages, moments,distributions, etc. We shall return to this shortly;
Although not as vital as measuring uncertainty first, "fuzzy probability."
and stochasticity, even physical science is chal- Fuzzy probability is based on the notion that
lenged to decide that phenomena are determin- many events cannot be stated in black or white,
istic. The collection of data and manipulation of yes or no, terms such as "I won, he lost," or "Blue
it to arrive at conclusions about deterministic lost 3 tanks, Red lost one." Many events are
cause and effect relationships, models and mea- "fuzzy," as in "I achieved my objective but suf-
surements of them, is of itself an involved task. fered more losses than he did," or "Blue had
three tanks crippled, while Red had one
destroyed." Fuzzy probability provides forMEASURING UNCERTAINTY AND results that are characterized by "membership
LIKELIHOOD functions," so that a fraction of the result belongs
to one event and a fraction to others. A calculus
Probability theory provides a measure of the like- of probability has been developed based on this
lihood that a particular event or sequence will premise and is in considerable vogue here and in
occur. Consider two versions of probability the- Europe.
ory: "classical probability," and "fuzzy probabil- Let us return now to the Law of Large num-
ity." Both are axiomatic, logically consistent bers and the problem of conducting repeated tri-
theories, but the importance of each and differ- als in combat. First of all, probability, as a
ences between them is in how we interpret the measure of likelihood, need not be interpreted in
mathematics in practical application. Here are terms of relative frequency. For example, a com-
the essential features. In classical probability the- mander may say that based on his experience
ory, outcomes are distinct; for example, I either and estimate of the situation, there are three sub-
roll a seven or I don't; I either win or lose the stantively different outcomes possible in a com-
tank battle; if one of the six sequences of the tank ing battle, and he "knows," or believes, outcome
battle occur, the other 5 do not; and so on. We #1 is three times as likely as either #2 or #3. We
assign numbers between 0 and 1 to these distinct therefore assign probability 3/5 to #1, 1/5 to #2
outcomes which order their likelihood of occur- and 1/5 to #3, thus quantifying the relationships
rence and which, classical theory asserts, will be he believes in. There is no prohibition of this
very nearly the ratio of the number of times a interpretation of probability theory and its atten-
particular event occurs to the total number of dant calculus, for example in determining the
times we do the whole process over again, likelihood of compound events. In this way we
Thus arises the relative frequency interpreta- avoid the issue of repeated trials, but raise a
tion of probability given repeated trials of an related issue, namely that of validation.
experiment or a battle; and what is called the The second fact is that many random vari-
"expected value" of many trials. What is called ables (i. e., probability measures) of importance
The Law of Large Numbers is simply a mathe- in combat (compound events) do involve large
Military Operations Research, Summer 1994 Page 55
COMMENTARY
numbers: the number of rounds of ammunition CONCLUSION
expended per day of combat per infantry battal-
ion, the average miss distance of all bombs Any combat can be fractionated practically ad
dropped by an attack squadron during a raid, infinitum into many, many possible sequences of
the number of messages entering a headquarters events by incorporating more and more detail
each day during an operation, etc. Probabilistic about the men, materials, and processes in the
descriptions in terms of means, distribution engagement. Clearly such a description is non-
functions, standard deviation, etc., are often nec- deterministic a priori, because we do not know
essary, undoubtedly appropriate, and known to which evolution will occur. If one could assign
be useful. Expected values (averages) are also accurate probabilities to all possibilities, then the
useful and sometimes good enough, even when probability of a particular sequence occurring
used as though they were deterministic, which would be so small as to be valueless in terms of
of course they are not. relative frequency. Further, even when we know
that a sequence of events in a battle is determined
Aggregation is another useful way to deal with a a posteriori, usually we will still not know every-
large number of possible results, each with an thing about the sequence that occurred. Our
infinitesimal probability of occurance. This done knowledge will be limited to what is accurately
by defining compound "events": collections of recorded in the after action reports.
elementary events, so that the probability distri- In order to make a useful interpretation of
bution is less diffuse. Here are two examples: probability and apply the statistics, the battle's
components, processes, and events must be
A. We may define two compound events aggregated, regardless of the hierarchical level.
from the sixteen possible sequences of rolling The coarseness and fineness issue is at the heart
craps four times. We define events: Z = All of stochastic modeling and its utility for under-
sequences with just one A (non-seven), and Y = standing combat. Hence, the issue also deter-
All other sequences. Compound event Z has mines one's outlook on the predictive power of a
four elementary events, while Y has 12. combat model, statistics, or historical insights.
B. In the tank battle, we may let the com- Predictive power is inescapably intertwined
pound event W contain all elementary events with the granularity issue: how much accuracy
which have more Blue tanks left than Red, and X in how much detail we require for practical
be all others. Then W and X each have three ele- application.
mentary sequences in them.
The effect of aggregation is to create com-
pound results (each still technically an "event"). ENDNOTES
Aggregation has an effect similar to that of
repeated trials. In terms of the Law of Large 1. P. Moose is the author of these observations, in
Numbers, the trials required to achieve an collaboration with W. Hughes. [page 14]
"expected value" outcome of the event or
sequence is the reciprocal of the probability that 2. Physicists have an even more rigorous, almost
the event will occur. Thus, if the probability dis- pathological, definition of determinism.
tribution is very diffuse, that is to say, with many Strictly deterministic processes, they say, are
events each with small likelihood, then many tri- reversible processes, "those in which there
als are required before the average result is like- exists a Lagrangian function L[q;ql which is a
ly to occur even once. Aggregating the events function only of the generalized coordinates q
aggregates the probabilities. Thus, when the and generalized velocities q." See R. B.
"expected" losses among 1,000 tanks is 500, the Lindsay, "Physics- to What Extent Is It
probability that exactly 523 will be lost is small Deterministic?" American Scientist, Summer
compared with the probability that between 400 1968, pp. 93-111. But observable, reversible
and 600 will be lost. physical processes are difficult to find
because of friction, and such a standard of
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determinism for living systems merely a
mathematical construct. What is true of phys-
ical systems logically must be true of more
complex living systems. We find in R. J. Field
"Chemical Organization in Time and Space"
American Scientist, April-May 1985: "All
observed changes that occur in living sys-
tems, even the most elemental, that occur due
to internal driving forces are irreversible."
Therefore, relevant determinism may be
taken to be that for which cause and effect
relationships can be traced and measured, at
least locally. For our purposes the stringency
of determinism is relaxed further, and said to
be not absolute but relative to the degree to
which the causes are specifiable and the
results are measurable and consequential.
[page 14]
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